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Flying the Warsaw Convention's
Not-So-Friendly Skies: Should Air
Carriers' Wilful Misconduct Go
Unpunished?
This Comment examines the possibility of awarding punitive
damages under the Warsaw Convention. A review of United States
judicial decisions regarding this issue is provided, along with an
examination of how the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Warsaw Convention in the past.
INTRODUCTION
A much disputed issue in the field of aviation litigation currently
surrounds the awarding of punitive damages under the 1929 Interna-
tional Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage By Air (Warsaw Convention or Convention).'
As the governing law2 regarding the rights and liabilities of passen-
gers and cargo involved in international air travel,3 the Warsaw Con-
vention is remarkably silent on the question of whether punitive
damages can be recovered from an air carrier whose wilful miscon-
duct results in passengers injured or killed during an international
air flight. This silence has led to a variety of United States judicial
interpretations regarding the availability of punitive damages, which
in turn has caused a split of authority involving such damages."
1. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1933) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. This treaty is widely
referred to as the Warsaw Convention, as it was signed in that city in 1929.
2. In the United States, all treaties are made a part of the "Supreme Law of the
Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 587 F. Supp. 1099 (D.C.
N.J. 1983). This Comment will restrict its scope to interpretation of the Convention by
courts in the United States.
3. "This convention shall apply to all international transportation of persons, bag-
gage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous trans-
portation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise." Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 (1), 49 Stat. at 3014, T.S. No. 876 at 16, 137 L.N.T.S.
at 15.
4. Two courts allowed the awarding of punitive damages in cases involving wilful
misconduct by the air carrier. See In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc.
This Comment explores the recent dilemma5 surrounding punitive
damages under the Warsaw Convention in an attempt to further de-
fine the issues and to suggest the correct resolution of this matter.
Part I provides a brief review of the Warsaw Convention's history
and its specific provisions relating to air carrier liability and damage
awards. Part II reviews the various United States circuit court and
court of appeals' decisions which have been reached in this matter.
Part III explores previous United States Supreme Court decisions on
the Warsaw Convention and relevant United States Supreme Court
decisions regarding treaty language interpretation. Finally, Part IV
suggests that the United States Supreme Court should resolve the
issue by allowing the awarding of punitive damages under the War-
saw Convention.
I. WARSAW CONVENTION HISTORY
The Warsaw Convention was drafted with the purpose of regulat-
ing international air travel in a uniform manner and limiting air car-
rier liability.6 The driving force behind the Convention was an
international desire to aid the new airline industry in expanding its
routes and allowing air carriers to obtain insurance coverage. 7 The
1929 Convention was attended by representatives from thirty-two
countries; although the United States was not represented by an offi-
cial delegate, United States observers were in attendance. 8
Aircraft at Karachi International Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp.
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Rein v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991). The District Court held that the Warsaw Convention did not pre-
empt a claim for punitive damages. See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Septem-
ber 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.D.C. 1987), cert. granted sub nom., Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd., 485 U.S. 986 (1988). A third court also seemed to indicate in dicta that
punitive damages would not be disallowed under the Warsaw Convention. Hill v. United
Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982).
Several courts have found contra by denying punitive damages in cases of wilful mis-
conduct. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir. 1991); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
5. The United States Supreme Court has only construed the meaning of the War-
saw Convention four times; all four Court decisions were reached in the last eight years.
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,
490 U.S. 122 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. 466 U.S. 243 (1984). See infra Part III.
6. The Convention "recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner
the conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the documents used for
such transportation and of the liability of the carrier." Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, Preamble, 49 Stat. at 3014, T.S. No. 876 at 16, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
7. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967); Kimberlee S. Cagle, The
Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International Aviation Accidents,
51 J. AIR L. & Com. 953 (1986).
S. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, MIN-
UTES, 3-10 (Robert C. Homer & Didier Legrez trans., 1975).
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The Warsaw Convention has been ratified by over 120 countries. 9
In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the treaty, thereby
incorporating the treaty into the law of the United States.' 0 The
Warsaw Convention was modified by the Hague Protocol" in 1955,
the Guadalajara Convention'2 of 1961, and the Montreal Agree-
ment13 in 1966.
A. Specific Provisions Regarding Liability
Three of the Warsaw Convention's articles' 4 relate specifically to
air carrier liability. Article 17 states:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.15
Article 18 provides for' the air carrier's liability involving the loss or
damage to baggage.' Article 19 states that "[t]he carrier shall be
liable for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of
9. LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LE-
GAL HANDBOOK 285-93 (1988) [hereinafter LEGAL HANDBOOK].
10. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
11. This modification, signed in Hague in 1955, amended a number of the Warsaw
Convention Articles. The Hague Protocol was never signed by the United States. See
AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIAL, 324 Office of the General Counsel
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1967).
12. The Guadalajara Convention was formed in order to clarify the liability of the
actual carrier as well as the contracting carrier. LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 6-7.
The Guadalajara Convention made several additional modifications to the Warsaw Con-
vention which are not relevant here.
13. The Montreal Agreement raised the liability limits of air carriers, as defined in
Article 22, to $75,000. The carriers also agreed to provide notice of this limit to passen-
gers by providing notice with the ticket. The Montreal Agreement is basically a contract
between the carrier and the passenger. Id. at 7.
Unless specifically noted differently, all currency references throughout this Comment
are in United States dollars.
14. The Warsaw Convention consists of 41 articles. Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1. The three articles relating specifically to air carrier liability are Articles 17, 18,
and 19. See infra notes 15-17.
15. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876 at
21, 137 L.N.T.S at 23.
16. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 18, 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at
21, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23, 25. Article 18(1) states that "[t]he carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked
baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place
during the transportation by air." Id. Articles 18(2) and 18(3) define air transportation
within the meaning of 1.8(1). Id.
passengers, baggage, or goods. ' 17
B. Specific Provisions Regarding Damages
Damage claims arising under any of these three articles are sub-
ject to the limitations in Article 24.18 The damage "conditions and
limits" described in Article 24 are found in Article 22.19 The Article
22 monetary limit of a damage award of 125,000 francs2 ° has been
modified by the Hague Protocol2' and the Montreal Agreement. 2
Article 25, however, eliminates these monetary limitations if the
carrier, or any of its employees, causes damage to a passenger or his
baggage by "wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the Court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct. '2 3 In essence,
17. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 19, 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at
22, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
18. Article 24 states:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph
shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions to who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24, 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S. No. 876 at 22, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
19. Article 22(1) provides:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passen-
ger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded
in the form of periodic payments, the equivalent capital value of the said pay-
ments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the
carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at 22, 137
L.N.T.S. at 25. Article 22(2) involves the monetary limit on baggage; Article 22(3) lim-
its the damage amount recoverable for property in passengers' charge; Article 22(4) de-
fines the standard of currency. Id.
20. At the time of the execution of the Warsaw Convention in 1929, 125,000
francs was equivalent to $4,898 U.S. dollars. John E.J. Clare, Evaluation of Proposals
to Increase the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. &
Com., 53, 54, 57 (1949).
21. The Hague Protocol doubled the passenger damage limitation from 125,000
francs to 250,000 francs. The United States never ratified the Protocol, however, as the
damage limit was still considered to be too low. See LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at
96.
22. In 1965, the United States threatened to denounce the Warsaw Convention
unless the limits on damages were raised. The Montreal Agreement raised the passenger
limit to $75,000 U.S. dollars, inclusive of attorney fees and costs. This agreement is not a
treaty, but an agreement which raises the limits on all flights into and out of the United
States. Id. at 96-97.
23. The full text of Article 25 reads:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to
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then, the air carrier may take advantage of the monetary damage
"cap" in Article 22 only when the air carrier does not engage in
wilful misconduct.
II. COURT DECISIONS REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In the cases that have addressed the issue of punitive damages
under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs usually ground their causes
of action for punitive damages in either Article 17 or Article 25 of
the Warsaw Convention. Based on Article 17, the plaintiffs' claim is
simply that air carriers are liable for "damage sustained" and the
Convention framers intended this to include punitive damage
awards. Under Article 25, plaintiffs contend that the limitations on
all damages under the Warsaw Convention dissolve under a finding
of air carrier wilful misconduct,24 and punitive damages are there-
fore appropriate. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the Warsaw
Convention's remedies are not exclusive so that punitive damages
can be awarded under state law or federal common law. In address-
- ing these causes of action, United States courts have split on whether
punitive damages are allowable under the Warsaw Convention.
A. Cases in Which Punitive Damages Have Been Granted
1. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,25 plain-
tiffs brought an action seeking, inter alia, punitive damages for inju-
ries sustained when Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by a
Soviet fighter over the Sea of Japan. The jury awarded $50 million
in punitive damages to the plaintiffs. Chief United States District
wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provi-
sions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
Warsaw Convention, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S. No. 876 at 23, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27.
24. This wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention has been defined by
United States courts as either "the intentional performance of an act with knowledge
that the performance of that act will probably result in injury" or "the intentional per-
formance of an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable
consequences." See Republic Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232, 238-39
(2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122,
124 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951)).
25. M.D.L. 565 Misc. No. 83-0345 (D.D.C. August 3, 1989).
Judge Aubrey E. Robinson affirmed 28 the jury's punitive award with-
out an opinion.21
2. In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Aircraft at Karachi International Airport,
Pakistan on September 5, 1986
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York appeared to also clear the way for the recovery of punitive
damages. In In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Aircraft at Karachi International Airport, Pakistan on September 5,
1986,28 a motion was brought by defendant Pan American World
Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) seeking partial summary judgment in dis-
missing plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages." Pan Am argued that
since Article 1730 of the Warsaw Convention, as supplemented by
the Montreal Agreement,3 created the cause of action for compen-
satory damages (as well as invoking a recovery limit of $75,000),
any recovery for punitive damages was pre-empted by the Warsaw
Convention.32
District Judge Sprizzo relied on the Second Circuit decision in To-
kio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp."3 in hold-
ing that "the remedy provided by the [Warsaw] Convention is not
exclusive." '34 Further, the judge stated that "[p]unitive damages are
a part of common law tort remedies . . . and no language in the
Convention expressly preempts or precludes such claims .... Nor
may such preemption be implied in the absence of some clear indica-
tion in the text itself or its legislative history that supports that con-
clusion."135 Judge Sprizzo interpreted the Convention's language as
strongly suggesting that independent state causes of action, including
26. Id. at *2; No. 83-0345, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11954 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1989).
27. In an appellate proceeding in 1987, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that "the proper inter-
pretation of the Convention and [Montreal] Agreement, as well as the scope of the trans-
feree court's interpretive authority in a case such as this one, are matters in need of
definitive resolution for our national court system." In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
28. 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). This holding was subsequently overturned
on March 22, 1991, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See
infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
29. This case involved the hijacking of Pan American Flight 073 from Bombay to
New York with 386 passengers on board. The aircraft was seized by terrorists during a
scheduled stop in Karachi; 20 passengers were killed and many were wounded. Id. at 18.
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 13, 22.
32. 729 F. Supp. at 17.
33. 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. 729 F. Supp. at 19. See 617 F.2d at 941-42.
35. 729 F. Supp. at 19.
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those for punitive damages, could be brought outside of the Conven-
tion. The Karachi court supported this interpretation by noting that
the Convention leaves many issues to be decided by the internal laws
of the parties bringing the action.36
Judge Sprizzo could not find any clear indication in the Warsaw
Convention language that would pre-empt a punitive damage claim;
in fact, the judge stated that the language in the Warsaw Conven-
tion leads to the opposite conclusion:
Article 24(1) provides that "any action for damages, however founded, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this conven-
tion." This language strongly suggests that the Convention contemplates
state causes'of action, including those for punitive damages, not founded in
or created by the Convention. Indeed, Article 24(2) expressly states that
the Convention applies "without prejudice to the questions as to who are





Therefore, based upon a plain reading of the Convention's treaty
language, the court ruled that punitive damages are available to
plaintiffs.
The Karachi court's second basis for allowing punitive damages
involved its interpretation of Article 25. The court ruled that even if
punitive damages were normally barred under the Convention, an air
carrier may not rely on Article 17 in cases of wilful misconduct.3 8
The court rejected Pan Am's argument that the only provision ex-
cluding or limiting liability under Article 25 is the monetary limit of
Article 22 (leaving Article 17 intact) because this reading of the
Convention would require a judicial alteration of the plain meaning
of the Convention.39 The Karachi court also found it significant that
an amendment to Article 25, which specifically lifted Article 22's
monetary limits in cases of air carrier wilful misconduct, had never
been ratified by the United States Senate. 0 This legislative refusal
to adopt the amendment strengthened the court's resolve in preclud-
ing a judicial amendment of Article 25.
In addition, the Karachi court criticized two other United States
36. Id.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Pan Am could not rely on Article 17's restrictions in cases of wilful misconduct
because, "to the extent that Article 17 is construed to preempt a claim for punitive dam-
ages, it would be a limitation or exclusion of liability within the meaning of Article 25,
and such claims would not be barred in cases involving wilful misconduct." Id.'at 20.
39. Id.
40. Id. This amendment was included in the Hague Protocol art. XIII; see supra
note 11.
District Court decisions 41 as relying too "heavily upon a judicially
perceived need to construe the Convention in accordance with the
intention of the Contracting Parties .... This court does not believe
that Chan42 permits the Court to amend the plain language of the
Convention to effectuate what it believes the Contracting Parties in-
tended.43 The Karachi court concluded that the awarding of puni-
tive damages was not prohibited by the Warsaw Convention and
denied Pan Am's motion for partial summary judgment.
B. Cases in Which Punitive Damages Have Been Denied
1. In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on
December 12, 1985
In 1987, the United States District Court for the Western Division
of Kentucky, Paducah Division, denied the awarding of punitive
damages to plaintiffs under the Warsaw Convention in In re Air
Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, on December 12, 1985."
Chief Judge Edward H. Johnstone examined the text of the Warsaw
Convention and the context in which its terms were used and de-
clared that Article 17 was entirely compensatory in tone.4" The Gan-
der court held that punitive damages do not fall within the liability
outlined by Article 17.14 Further, even in cases of "wilful miscon-
duct," the court held that the Article 25 ,exclusions are properly in-
terpreted as exceptions to the limitations on compensatory damages
only, and not as an implied authority for recovery of punitive
17damages. 7
After reviewing the Convention's history, Chief Judge Johnstone
found no evidence indicating that the Convention signatories in-
tended to allow punitive damages.48 The Gander court approvingly
41. The two decisions are Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1483-89
(11 th Cir. 1989), and In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1980 v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 1267 (2nd Cir. 1991). See infra notes 59
and 69 and accompanying text. These cases are examined in detail below.
42. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
43. In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi
International Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp. at 20.
44. 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ky. 1987). On December 12, 1985, Arrow Air flight
950's DC-8 aircraft crashed on takeoff from Gander International Airport, Gander,
Newfoundland, killing everyone on board. Plaintiffs' decedents were United States ser-
vicemen travelling from Cairo, United Arab Republic, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with
scheduled stops in Cologne, West Germany and Gander, Newfoundland. Id. at 930.
45. The court held that "[o]n its face, the text of Article 17, as set forth above, is
entirely compensatory in tone. It establishes liability only for 'damages sustained' or
'bodily injury suffered' by a passenger." Id. at 931.
46. "Punitive damages are not 'damages sustained' by a particular plaintiff.
Rather, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish a defendant for his conduct
and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future." Id.
47. Id. at 932.
48. Chief Judge Johnstone examined several treatises, journal articles, cases, and a
[VOL. 29: 335. 1992] Warsaw Convention
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
cited other decisions disallowing punitive damage awards under the
Convention, including Butler v. Aeromexico49 and Harpalani v. Air-
India, Inc.,5" and refused to follow the Kansas District Court's rea-
soning in Hill v. United Airlines, Inc.51 to allow a claim for punitive
damages.52
2. Thompson v. British Airways
The District Court for the District of Columbia also disallowed
punitive damages in Thompson v. British Airways.53 Judge Penn de-
termined that liability was limited under Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention, and to allow punitive damages would be contrary to the
intent of the Warsaw Convention. 4 Also, the court asserted that the
plaintiffs had not alleged facts sufficient to constitute wilful miscon-
duct by the airline, and, therefore, Article 25 was not available to
the plaintiffs. 5
In an unpublished opinion,56 the appellate court affirmed the lower
Thompson court's decision regarding dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for
punitive damages. 7 The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had
transcript of the Convention minutes before concluding that "[n]either uniformity, insur-
ability nor an effective limitation of liability would be achieved if punitive damages could
be recovered against an air carrier under the Convention. Consequently, punitive dam-
ages may not be recovered under the Convention." Id. at 933.
49. 774 F. 2d 429 (1lth Cir. 1985).
50. 634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Il. 1986).
51. 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982). See supra note 4.
52. The Gander court did not find the decision in Hill v. United Airlines, Inc. to be
persuasive:
In Hill, the plaintiffs claimed damages for 'intentional misrepresentation'
under the Warsaw Convention. The court in Hill found that such a claim was
'completely outside the Warsaw Convention.' Inexplicably, the court went on to
allow a claim for punitive damages under the Article 25 'wilful misconduct'
exception from limitation. The court did not explain how the claim before it
could be outside the Convention but grounded in the language of Article
25 .... The reasoning in Hill is not logically consistent and the court's hold-
ing is of dubious precedential value in this case. Consequently, this court de-
clines to follow the rule or the decision in Hill.
684 F. Supp. at 933 (citations omitted).
53. M.D.L. No. 87-3352, 1989 WL 43997 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 1989). The plaintiffs
herein had missed a connecting flight from Washington, D.C. to Freetown, were errone-
ously downgraded by the airline, and their baggage arrived late and damaged. Id.
54. Id. at *4.
55. Id. at *2.
56. D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and
explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpub-
lished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its
quality as precedent, is relevant.
57. Thompson v. British Airways, Inc., 901 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20,
not alleged any facts indicating that the air carrier had committed
any reckless or intentional bad acts. Therefore, the appellate court
found it unnecessary to address the issue of punitive damages under
the Warsaw Convention.58
3. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
Approximately one month later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals directly addressed the punitive damages issue in Floyd v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc."9 The case was dismissed by the trial court for
failure to state a claim 60 upon which relief could be granted (under
either Florida or federal law).61 The appellate court remanded the
case on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress6 2
before addressing the punitive damage claim. 3
Circuit Judge Anderson examined the Convention's structure, sub-
sequent interpretation by the parties, and case law before concluding
that Article 25 operated only to remove the liability damage limita-
tions in cases of 'wilful misconduct' and did not create an indepen-
dent cause of action.64 Although the plaintiffs in Floyd did not argue
that the cause of action for injuries under Article 17 authorized re-
covery of punitive damages, the court did note that Article 17 only
contemplated compensatory damages.65 The court of appeals also
1990)(table)(text available in Westlaw under 901 F.2d 1131 with this case name), cert.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
58. Id. Regarding the requirement of "intentional or reckless acts" to justify a
punitive damage award, see Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1486 (11th
Cir. 1989).
59. 872 F.2d 1462. In Floyd, plaintiffs brought an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress when their aircraft, en route from Miami to Nassau, lost power in
all three engines. As the aircraft began a powerless descent towards the Atlantic Ocean,
the flight crew informed the passengers to prepare for ditching. Fortunately, the crew
was able to restart one of the failed engines and the aircraft was landed safely in Miami.
Id.
60. The plaintiffs' claims were grounded on two theories. The first was a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law. The plaintiffs
alleged: (1) Eastern's maintenance personnel failed to install the required oil rings on the
engines to prevent leaks; (2) Eastern's own records indicated that its aircraft had exper-
ienced 12 previous engine failures due to the same faulty maintenance; and (3) the air-
line knowingly failed to correct its maintenance problems.
The second claim was an action for punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention.
Id.
61. In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5,
1983, 629 F. Supp. 307, 309 n.1 (S.D. Fla 1986), rev'd, 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, Il1 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
62. This issue was eventually decided by the United States Supreme Court in East-
ern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991), and will be examined in this Com-
ment in Part III below. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
63. 872 F.2d at 1467.
64. Plaintiffs contended that Article 25 created an independent cause of action
which authorized the recovery of punitive damages. Id. at 1483.
65. Id. at 1485 n.37. The Floyd court later added:
It is true that the text of the Convention does not explicitly address the issue of
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concluded that a claim for punitive damages under state law is pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention and is therefore disallowed. 6
Lastly, the Floyd court distinguished punitive damage from com-
pensatory damage awards. Because punitive awards are not intended
to compensate victims, and the Convention was compensatory in na-
ture, the court determined that punitive damages were not contem-
plated by the Convention's drafters.6" The court reasoned that
disallowing punitive damages would also be consistent with the Con-
vention's purpose of establishing international uniformity.68
4. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21,
1988 v. Pan American World Airways Inc.
The most recent United States court of appeals decision regarding
punitive damages was a joint decision on this same issue on March
22, 1991, in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December
21, 1988 v. Pan American Airways Inc. and In re Hijacking of Pan
American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi International
Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986.69 After acknowledging that
the Convention's silence on the subject of punitive damages, as well
as the lack of legislative materials, made interpretation difficult, the
court of appeals ruled that the Convention's purposes would be con-
travened by allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages. 0 Circuit
Judge Cardamone wrote a painstakingly detailed analysis of the is-
sue in six parts, including:
1) A discussion of the Convention's purposes, structure, and
history."'
punitive damages. However, we do not think plaintiffs can take much comfort
in this 'silence.' The basis for recovery for passengers who suffer death or per-
sonal injury in international air travel is Article 17 of the Convention. Our
study of the text and structure of the Convention, and the concurrent and sub-
sequent legislative history persuade us that Article 17 is entirely compensatory
in nature.
Id. at 1486.
66. Id. at 1485.
67. Id. at 1486-89.
68. Id. at 1488.
69. 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991). The facts of the
Karachi case are outlined above. See supra note 29. The Lockerbie case arose from the
terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, en route from London to New York on Decem-
ber 21, 1988. The Boeing 747 aircraft crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland; all passengers and
crew were killed.
70. 928 F.2d at 1270.
71. Id. at 1270-71.
2) An analysis of punitive damages in American law and an ex-
amination of whether the Convention provides an exclusive cause of
action or whether it permits separate state law actions claiming pu-
nitive damages.72
3) A conclusion that the Convention bars state wrongful death
actions.73
4) An adoption of the federal common law of torts as the appro-
priate means (i.e., the governing law) to interpret the Convention,
and a conclusion that federal common law does not contemplate a
compensatory element in a punitive action. 4
5) A decision that the Convention does not permit the sort of pu-
nitive damages available under federal law to be awarded, even when
the liability limitations are lifted under Article 25 in cases of wilful
misconduct.75
6) A declaration that the policy considerations that led the con-
tracting parties to adhere to the Convention strongly militate against
recognition of punitive damages.7"
After examining the punitive damage issue in great depth, Judge
Cardamone concluded that punitive damages are not recoverable
under the Warsaw Convention.77
To date, then, a majority of district courts and appellate courts
have denied punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention, while
several district courts have allowed them. The courts' major split is
on the appropriate interpretation of the Convention's liability and
damage articles and the intent of the framers. In an attempt to rec-
oncile the varying opinions, it may prove beneficial to explore the
United States Supreme Court rulings on the Warsaw Convention in
determining how the Supreme Court may decide on the punitive
damage issue.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS
Although the Warsaw Convention was signed into law in the
United States in 1934, only four cases involving an interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention have been decided by the United States Su-
preme Court. Each of the four cases has been decided in the previous
eight years. A chronological examination of these four cases follows.
72. Id. at 1271-73.
73. Id. at 1273-78.
74. Id. at 1278-80.
75. Id. at 1280-87.
76. Id. at 1287-88.
77. Id. at 1288.
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A. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.
The Court's first look at the Warsaw Convention occurred in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp." in 1984. This
case provided the Court an opportunity to construe the meaning of a
portion of the Convention's liability limits.79 Although the United
States Supreme Court's holding focused primarily on the determina-
tion of the proper cargo liability limit, the Court made several im-
portant declarations regarding the Warsaw Convention itself.
Writing for the Court in a eight to one decision, 80 Justice
O'Connor stated that the task of determining the appropriate liabil-
ity limits was "made considerably easier by the 50 years of consis-
tent international and domestic practices under the Convention.""
The Court reasoned that any decision regarding the Convention in-
terpretation should be consistent with: 1) the Convention framers'
purpose, 2) well-established international practices, and 3) other de-
cisions reached by the remaining signatories since 1929.82 Justice
O'Connor also acknowledged that the Convention framers did not
intend the treaty to survive more than a few years.83
B. Air France v. Saks
The United States Supreme Court re-examined the Warsaw Con-
vention one year later in Air France v. Saks." This decision, also
78. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
79. Franklin Mint Corporation had delivered four packages of numismatic materi-
als (total weight was 714 pounds) to Trans World Airlines, Inc., for delivery from Phila-
delphia to London. The packages were subsequently lost. Franklin brought suit in United
States District Court to recover the value of the packages in the amount of $250,000.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., disputed the amount of liability, claiming that Article 22
limits an air carrier's liability regarding baggage transportation to $ 9.07 per pound. Id.
80. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. Id.
81. Id. at 255.
82. Id. at 255-56.
83. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The Convention's framers viewed the treaty as one "drawn for a few years,"
not for "one or two centuries." That it has in fact been adhered to for over half
a century is a tribute not only to the Framers' skills but to the signatories'
manifest willingness to accept a flexible implementation of the Convention's
terms.
Id. at 259 (footnote omitted).
84. 470 U.S. 392 (1985). All Justices joined in this opinion, except Justice Powell,
who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
In Air France v. Saks, Respondent Saks had boarded an Air France aircraft in Paris
for a flight to New York. During the aircraft's descent, Saks experienced severe pressure
and pain in her left ear. Five days later, Saks consulted a doctor who concluded that
Saks had become permanently deaf in her left ear.
written by Justice O'Connor, addressed the interpretation of the
term "accident" under Article 17.8r Justice O'Connor began the
Court's analysis by reviewing the text of the treaty and the context
in which the written words were used. The Court noted that because
the governing text of the Convention is in the French language, any
treaty term interpretation would require the Court to consider the
term's French meaning.86
After determining the French meaning, the Saks Court once
again noted that proper treaty interpretation should be consistent
with the negotiating history of the Convention, the conduct of the
parties to the Convention, and the weight of precedent in foreign and
American courts.87 Justice O'Connor reviewed the Convention's
drafting and negotiation records to aid in the Court's interpretative
process.88
C. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.
In Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd.,89 the United States Supreme
Court examined the issue of whether an international air carrier
loses the benefit of the damages limitation pursuant to the Warsaw
Saks brought suit, alleging that her injury was caused due to negligent maintenance
and operation of the aircraft's pressurization system. Air France moved for summary
judgment in federal district court, contending that Saks could not prove that her injury
was caused by an 'accident' within the meaning of Article 17. The district court granted
summary judgment for Air France; the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 394-95.
85. In interpreting the term "accident," Justice O'Connor noted that "treaties are
construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may
look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties." Id. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of
Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
86. The Court reviewed French cases and dictionaries in its analysis because:
To determine the meaning of the term "accident" in Article 17 we must con-
sider its French legal meaning. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (CA2), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323 (CA5 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). This is true not be-
cause "we are forever chained to French law" by the Convention, see Rosman
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y. 2d 385, 394, 358 N.Y. S.2d 97, 102,
314 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1974), but because it is our responsibility to give the
specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations
of the contracting parties. Reed, supra, at 1090; Day v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). We look to
the French legal meaning for guidance to these expectations because the War-
saw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
497, 498-500 (1967).
Id. at 399.
87. Id. at 400.
88. Id. See also Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. at 431.
89. 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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Convention if the required limitation notice is not given to passen-
gers as provided in the Montreal Agreement." Justice Scalia pro-
vided the opinion of the Court.
Justice Scalia refused to examine the Convention's drafting his-
tory, holding that it was appropriate to examine the drafting history
of the Convention only to assist in interpreting an ambiguous provi-
sion; "[b]ut where the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to
insert an amendment." 91 Justice Scalia restated the role of the Court
in interpreting a treaty by quoting approvingly from one of Justice
Story's opinions in 1821:
[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether
small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of
power, and not an exercise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and
not to construe a treaty. Neither can this court supply a casus omissus in a
treaty, any more than in a law. We are to find out the intention of the
parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter; and
having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop
where that stops - whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which
it leaves behind. 2
The Chan Court also indicated that even if the treaty provision was
ambiguous, it may only be contradicted by clear drafting history,
which was not present.9 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan94 stated that Justice
Scalia's interpretation of the Convention's provisions was not the
only plausible reading, and therefore the Court should properly re-
view the drafting history.95 The concurrence carefully reviewed the
90. This case arose from the downing of a Korean Air Lines, Ltd. Boeing 747 by a
Soviet fighter on September 1, 1983. All 269 persons on board the 747 were killed. Id. at
123. See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, M.D.L. 565 No.
83-0345 (D.D.C. August 3, 1989).
In 1969, Korean Air Lines had agreed to raise its liability limit for injuries to passen-
gers to $75,000 per passenger, pursuant to the Montreal Agreement. The Agreement also
required air carriers to give passengers written notice of this limit in print size no smaller
than ten-point type. This notice was provided to Korean Air Lines' passengers on their
airline tickets in smaller eight-point type. Passengers sought a declaration that this type
size discrepancy deprived Korean Air Lines of the benefit of the damage limitation. 490
U.S. at 124.
91. Id. at 134.
92. Id. at 135 (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71 (1821)).
93. Id. at 134 n.5.
94. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
95. "Certainly it is wrong to disregard the wealth of evidence to be found in the
Convention's drafting history on the intent of the governments that drafted the docu-
ment. It is altogether proper that we consider such extrinsic evidence of the
treatymakers' intent." Id. at 136.
minutes of the Convention's drafting committee as well as subse-
quent case law before agreeing with Justice Scalia's holding that the
air carrier did not lose the benefit of the Convention's liability limit
because of the size of the type used in the notice.96
D. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd
The United States Supreme Court's most recent ruling regarding
the Warsaw Convention was decided on April 17, 1991."' The Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision allowing re-
covery for emotional distress.98 Writing for a unanimous Court, Jus-
tice Marshall once again outlined the Court's methodology in treaty
interpretation"9 by stating that the Court should begin with the
treaty's text and the context in which the written words were used; if
the treaty's terms were ambiguous, the Court may examine the
treaty's history, negotiations, and practical construction adopted by
the parties. 00
In order to properly interpret the Warsaw Convention, Justice
Marshall reiterated the guideline established in Air France v. Saks
to consider the French legal interpretation of any Warsaw treaty
term to determine the shared expectations of the Convention's signa-
tories. 1 1 The Court examined bilingual dictionaries,0 2 official Eng-
lish treaty translations, 03 and French legal materials. 104 With
96. Id. at 152.
97. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, II S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
98. Id. at 1493. See also supra notes 59, 60. Because the passengers did not al-
lege any physical injury, the Court did not address the issue of whether emotional dam-
ages accompanied by physical injury would be recoverable. Also, the Court did not reach
the question of whether the Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for the
passengers, or whether a state cause of action may be maintained. Lastly, the passengers
did not appeal the Eleventh Circuit's decision disallowing punitive damages, so the issue
was not addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
99. The dispute herein centered on the proper interpretation of "lesion
corporelle" in Article 17. Eastern Airlines argued that the term is properly translated to
"bodily injury," thereby excluding passengers from recovering for purely emotional inju-
ries. The passengers argued, and the Court of Appeals below agreed, that the term more
properly encompassed purely emotional damages. Id. at 1492. The Court of Appeals
analysis is reported in 872 F.2d 1462 (lth Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 59-68 and
accompanying text.
100. 111 S. Ct. at 1492 (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,
486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988), quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987), quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 397 (1985)). Accord Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989);
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1963).
101. 111 S. Ct. at 1494. See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 399.
102. 111 S. Ct. at 1494. The Court translated from JULES JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE
FRANCAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANCAIS DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES 205
(1953); 3 GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE 1833 (1987).
103. 111 S. Ct. at 1494, 1495. The Court relied on two major translations of the
1929 Convention into English, as well as the version which the United States Senate
utilized when ratifying the treaty. See RENE H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME
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respect to French legal materials, the Court reviewed three principal
sources of French law: legislation, judicial decisions, and scholarly
writing.
After ruling that Article 17's term "lesion corporelle" was ambig-
uous, Justice Marshall turned to the treaty's drafting history and
concluded that the Convention's drafters never specifically consid-
ered liability for emotional damages. The Floyd Court then noted
two plausible explanations "why the subject of mental injuries never
arose during the Convention proceedings: (1) many jurisdictions did
not recognize recovery for mental injury at that time, or (2) the
drafters simply could not contemplate a psychic injury unaccompa-
nied by a physical injury."' 05 The Court was persuaded that because
compensation for emotional distress was largely unavailable in 1929,
the signatories had no intent to include such a remedy in the
Convention.'0 6
The Floyd Court again took note that the Convention's primary
purpose was to limit the air carrier's liability so as to promote the
growth of the fledgling industry. In that regard, the 1929 signatories
were "more concerned with protecting air carriers and fostering a
new industry than providing full recovery to injured passengers."' 10
Justice Marshall also relied on the signatories' post-1929 conduct
and signatory interpretation to further support the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation as a uniform one.'08
OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 197 (1981). The same interpretation appears in
the translation used in the United Kingdom Carriage by Air Act of 1932. See LEGAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 9.
104. 111 S. Ct. at 1495. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
105. 111 S. Ct. at 1498.
106. Id. at 1498-99.
107. Id. at 1499.
108. Id. The Floyd Court found only one signatory opinion which addressed-and
allowed-recovery for purely mental injuries under Article 17.
The Supreme Court of Israel allowed passengers to recover for emotional damages
suffered during a 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight. See Cie Air France v. Teichner,
39 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien, at 243, 23 Eur. Tr. L., at 102. (The only published
version of this Israeli case found by Justice Marshall was reported in French). The Su-
preme Court of Israel emphasized the post-1929 development of the aviation industry
and the law of torts and adopted an expansive view of treaty interpretation.
Although Justice Marshall noted the need for uniformity with other signatory deci-
sions, the Floyd Court was not persuaded by the Supreme Court of Israel's reasoning
and declined to follow the Israel decision. 111 S. Ct. at 1501, 1502.
IV. How THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether punitive damages are allowed under the Warsaw
Convention, the conflict in the lower courts, as well as Circuit Judge
Ginsburg's appeal for national resolution,109 indicates that the Court
may be required to grant certiorari on this issue in the near future.
By employing the same methodology that the United States Su-
preme Court has previously applied in interpreting treaty provisions
in the four Warsaw Convention cases above,110 as well as examining
the current Court's treatment of punitive damages, it is apparent
that punitive damages may well be recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention.
A. Interpreting the Text and Context
The Supreme Court has begun its interpretative process in every
Warsaw case by examining the disputed text"" and the context in
which the words were used." 2 Further, the Floyd Court stated that
"[b]ecause the only authentic text of the Warsaw Convention is in
French, the French text must guide our analysis." 113 The parties in
several of the Warsaw punitive damage cases above have focused
their dispute on the term "dommage survenu" in Article 17.114
1. French Interpretation
The term "dommage survenu" translates into "damage sustained"
in the official English version of the Warsaw Convention ratified by
the United States Senate." 5 The United States Supreme Court ac-
cepted this translation in Air France v. Saks."06 Therefore, the Eng-
lish translation of Article 17 would begin: "The carrier shall be
liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of
a passenger .... ,,17 Several United States courts have agreed with
109. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176'
(1987).
110. See supra Part III.
111. It is arguable that no express term regarding punitive damages is even in the
treaty to interpret. This appears to be Judge Sprizzo's reasoning in In re Hijacking of
Pan American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi International Airport, Pakistan
on September 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). However, as the United States
Supreme Court has always looked at the French language first in its Warsaw Convention
interpretative process, the examination here will be consistent with that approach.
112. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
113. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1493 (1991).
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes I and 15 and accompanying text.
116. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the air carriers' argument that the term "damage sustained" is en-
tirely compensatory in tone and have therefore concluded that an
award for punitive damages would be inconsistent with Article 17's
language.118
Interestingly, the French-English translation relied upon by the
United States Senate - and subsequently adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks - is not technically
correct. The New Cassell's French Dictionary does indeed define
"dommage" -as "damage, injury, hurt, detriment, loss, harm." 119
This same reference, however, translates "survenir" as "to arrive or
happen unexpectedly." 20 According to the Manual of Law French,
the proper French translation for "sustain" is "sustenir.'' The
proper translation under Article 17, then, would provide that "[t]he
carrier is liable for damage happening or arising unexpectedly in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger. . . ." The tone of this
translation is arguably less compensatory than the translation relied
upon by the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks. At the minimum,
the dispute in interpretation should be considered ambiguous and
would require the United States Supreme Court to use additional
methods to correctly interpret Article 17.122
Since this French-English translation by itself does not resolve the
punitive damage issue, the U.S. Supreme Court will most likely at-
tempt to clarify Article 17's proper construction by examining
French legal materials. As outlined in Floyd above, the Court will
follow the same procedure used by French jurists in 1929 by relying
on three principal sources of French law: legislation, judicial deci-
sions, and scholarly writing.2 3 The optimum starting point for the
Court, however, will be the same reference summary utilized by
French jurists in 1929: the French Civil Code.
118. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, on December 12,
1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 931 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d-
1462, 1486 (11th Cir. 1989).
119. THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 266 (Denis Girard ed. 1967).
120. Id. at 705.
121. JOHN H. BAKER, MANUAL OF LAW FRENCH 189 (1979).
122. The plaintiffs in In re Air Crash at Gander, Newfoundland, asserted this
same type of argument. The court declined to accept plaintiffs' interpretation, however,
after noting that the plaintiffs cited no authority for their assertion. 684 F. Supp. 927,
931 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
123. Eastern Airlines, Inc., ill S. Ct. at 1495.
2. French Civil Law
The French legal system relies heavily on the French Civil Code, a
compilation of articles imposing primarily contractual duties on par-
ties.124 The distinctions between a common law jurisdiction and a
civil law system are important:
[N]umerous rules differ if applied in the context of contractual or non-con-
tractual rights and duties: the choice of law in conflicts cases, jurisdiction of
courts, limitations of time to sue, the liability of co-defendants, legal pre-
sumptions, legal damages. Indeed, in French law a breach of contractual
duty cannot be enforced by invoking the articles of the [French Civil] Code
applicable to non-contractual liability. The common law may classify as
torts many situations treated as contractual in civil law systems: profes-
sional malpractice, and carrier's liability for personal and property damage,
are examples. In French law if the same act constitutes both a breach of
contract and a tort, the courts follow the rule of non-cumul, not permitting
option or waiver, but requiring that the action be exclusively in contract.125
Although the French civil law system is dominated by contract
law, it does not follow that tort law has been ignored. 126 In fact,
French civil law provides that certain types of punitive damage
awards are recoverable in some cases. 27 Major difficulties in inter-
pretation and application arise, however, because French law has not
expanded or explored the various aspects of tort law as has the com-
mon law system.'28 Ninety percent of the judicial decisions regarding
French Civil Code Article 1384,129 for example, have been connected
with motor vehicle accidents. 130 Because the French civil law system
124. THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (as amended July 1, 1976)(John H. Crabb trans.
1977). "The Civil Code is the most basic of the codes and the most fundamental and
pervasive single element of all French law." Id. at 2. The French Civil Code contains
over 600 articles pertaining to standard contracts; only five articles (articles 1382-1386)
pertain to the French law of tort. HENRY P. DEVRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-
ANMERICAN LAWYER 309, 310 (1976).
125. DEVRIES, supra note 124, at 309 (citations omitted).
126. The French civil law system places the Anglo-American concepts of contract
and tort under the law of obligations. The French Civil Code, however, does not have a
distinct heading for "obligations." Id.
127. One such situation arises under French law when a judgment debtor refuses
to comply with the terms of his civil punishment:
The astreinte provided by French law is a coercive penalty which is imposed
upon the judgment debtor in case of his non-compliance for the purpose of
enforcing a civil judgment. For example, the debtor can be ordered to pay the
creditor a certain sum for every infraction of a prohibitory judgment or for
every day of non-compliance with a judgment decreeing performance of an act.
The peculiarity of the sanction lies, above all, in the fact that the astreinte is
not paid into the state treasury but to the judgment creditor.
XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 108 (1981).
128. The essence of French tort law is covered by only five articles in the French
Civil Code under a chapter title of "Delicts and Quasi-Delicts." THE FRENCH CIVIL
CODE 253, 254 (as amended July 1, 1976) (John H. Crabb trans. 1977).
129. Article 1384 states: "He is liable not only for the damage which he caused by
his own act, but also for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom he is
responsible, or by things which he has in his keeping." Id. at 253.
130. Id. at 311.
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offers little guidance on tort issues, the Supreme Court will most
properly explore other areas in order to interpret the treaty correctly.
B. Determining the Framers' Intent
1. Purposes of the Convention
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized in all four Warsaw deci-
sions that the Court's interpretative process must be consistent with
the Convention framers' purposes."3' The Warsaw Convention's pri-
mary purpose was to uniformly regulate air carriers' liability to pas-
sengers and baggage, so as to encourage growth in a fledgling
industry.'32 Further, the Court has declared that the "Convention
was intended to reduce, not to increase, the economic uncertainties
of air transportation."' 13 3 Punitive damage awards would appear to
be contrary to this purpose, because a large enough punitive award
could have had a crippling effect on a new air carrier in 1929.13"
131. See supra Part III. The United States Supreme Court has stated that proper
Warsaw Convention treaty interpretations must conform with the treaty's purpose of es-
tablishing a "stable, predictable, and internationally uniform limit" that would en-
courage early industry growth. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. at 256.
132. See supra note 6. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. at 256.
133. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. at 260. Justice
O'Connor outlined the Convention's purposes in this way: "The Convention's first and
most obvious purpose was to set some limit on a carrier's liability for lost cargo .... The
Convention's second objective was to set a stable, predictable, and internationally uni-
form limit that would encourage the growth of a fledgling industry." Id. at 255.
134. Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984), cites a staff memorandum from the Chief, Policy
Development Division, to the Civil Aeronautics Board on March 18, 1980. This memo-
randum reveals an interesting opinion on the background of the Convention's liability
limits:
The Warsaw Convention was negotiated during the late 1920's when the
aviation industry was in its infancy. The minutes of the negotiations show that
the primary concerns of the drafters are no longer of great importance to the
industry. In addition, their assumptions about how the liability limitation
mechanism would work were erroneous.
In 1929, air travel was perceived by the public and, more importantly, by the
insurance companies to be an extremely risky mode of transportation. A major
justification for limiting liability was that, unless carriers could present poten-
tial insurers with some degree of predictability in estimating damages from
aircraft accidents, they would have great difficulty in obtaining coverage. Fur-
thermore, the delegates had little sympathy for anyone foolish enough to board
an airplane without enough personal insurance to provide for his widow (or her
widower) and children should the plane crash. Over the years, air travel has
become one of the safest modes of transportation, and airlines, even those oper-
ating under circumstances where they cannot limit their liability for death or
Significantly, though, neither the Convention's minutes30 nor text
language 36 indicate that the framers ever purposely intended to
shield an air carrier from punitive damage liability for an air car-
rier's wilful or reckless bad actions.1 37 In fact, the passenger recovery
limit for compensatory damages is lifted upon a finding of wilful
misconduct by an air carrier.1 38 Because the Convention signatories
were willing to expressly compensate passengers more fully in cases
of air carrier reckless behavior, 39 it would seem inconsistent for the
Convention framers to silently imply that the naturally following pu-
nitive damages would not be recoverable. Therefore, since the signa-
tories did not expressly prohibit punitive damage awards, a plain
reading of the treaty would indicate that the framers did not intend
to exclude punitive damages.
2. Convention Limits
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the
Warsaw Convention prohibits state or federal causes of action based
upon situations in which the Convention was not meant to govern. 140
In fact, the title of the Convention itself - "Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air" - indicates that the Warsaw
Convention was never intended by the framers to be an all encom-
passing agreement. The Minutes of the Convention indicate that the
delegates specifically included the word "Certain" to show that the
Convention would not cover all situations.14' Therefore, the awarding
personal injury, have no special difficulties finding insurers.
Id. at 274 n.4.
135. See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL
LAW. MINUTES, supra note 8.
136. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
137. The terms "punitive" or "exemplary damages" do not even appear in the
Minutes. See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW,
MINUTES, supra note 8.
138. See supra note 23.
139. By a plain reading of Article 25, it is reasonable to conclude that, in cases of
carrier wilful misconduct, the framers intended that a requirement of full compensation
to injured plaintiffs outweighed any need for a concrete measurable damage standard for
the carrier. An award for punitive damages in cases of wilful misconduct would be con-
sistent with this approach. Id.
140. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1481 (11th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiffs contended that the Convention provided for state causes of action to be brought
involving issues which the Convention did not address. The appellate court dismissed the
state claim brought by the plaintiffs. When the case was brought to the United States
Supreme Court, the dismissed state claim cause of action was not appealed by the plain-
tiffs, so the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether state claims are
pre-empted by the Warsaw Convention. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, I I1 S. Ct. 1489
(1991).
141. Mr. Giannini, President of the drafting committee, stated:
We have adopted the title: 'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air.' This suffices to say that this Con-
vention does not provide for the entire matter and gives satisfaction to certain
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of punitive damages in separate state or federal causes of action
would not appear to contradict the framers' explicit intention of pro-
viding signatories with only an initial guideline in the Warsaw
Convention.
C. Practical Considerations
1. Consistent Interpretation with Other Signatory Countries
One justifiable concern of the United States Supreme Court in
Warsaw Convention treaty interpretation cases is a desire to render
judgments consistent with the other signatories. 142 Consistent judg-
ments from the over 120 signatory countries would lend stability and
predictability to Warsaw Convention decisions, as well as prevent
party forum shopping. However, apparently no decisions have been
reported by other signatories' courts either allowing or disallowing
punitive damages under the Convention. Therefore, a United States
decision authorizing punitive damage awards would not be disruptive
to the United States Supreme Court's goal of rendering consistent
judgments with the other signatories.
2. Punitive Damage Awards in Signatory Countries
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore the availability
of punitive damages in the more than 120 signatory countries which
adhere to the Warsaw Convention.'43 Generally, although punitive
damage awards are an exception to established tort principles in
most countries, the United States is not the sole jurisdiction 44 which
will allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages. Warsaw signato-
ries England, France, Mexico, Norway, West Germany, Switzer-
land, and Turkey each will allow a plaintiff, in certain instances, to
recover punitive damages or have the defendant's degree of fault be
considered when assessing compensatory damages. 46
delegations such as the Czechoslovak Delegation, which asked that the word
'Certain' be added.
See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, MINUTES,
supra note 8, at 188.
142. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 404.
143. See LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 9.
144. See XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 10, at 82-
87 (1981).
145. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion of Ko-
rean Air Lines to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims for Punitive Damages, In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, M.D.L. 565 Misc. 83-0345 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1989).
3. Punitive Damage Awards in the United States
Notably, the awarding of punitive damages under the Convention
by the United States Supreme Court would be consistent with
United States federal common law. A recent United States Supreme
Court decision involving the awarding of punitive damages illustrates
the current Court's disposition towards punitive damages. In Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,4 6 the Court 147 held that al-
lowing punitive damages did not necessarily violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court recognized the long
common law history148 of punitive damages in England by citing
Blackstone's Commentaries 49 and the case of Wilkes v. Wood,10 a
1763 England decision. The Haslip Court also cited American deci-
sions allowing punitive damages from as far back as 1784101 and
1791.112 The Court determined that the reasonableness of the jury's
punitive award could be measured on a case-by-case basis.'0 3
146. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). This Alabama case involved an insurance agent who
misappropriated health and life insurance premiums. When the insurance companies had
stopped receiving premium payments, the insurance companies cancelled the respondents'
policies; the insurance agent did not notify respondents that their policies had lapsed.
Respondent Haslip was hospitalized and incurred hospital and physician's charges. Be-
cause the insurance companies refused coverage, the physician billed Haslip directly.
When Haslip was unable to pay, the physician placed Haslip's delinquent account with a
collection agency, which obtained a judgment against Haslip. Haslip's credit was ad-
versely affected. Respondents filed suit against the insurance companies on a theory of
respondeat superior. The jury determined that fraud had occurred and awarded punitive
damages. Id.
147. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices Scalia
and Kennedy filed concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Jus-
tice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Id.
148. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1262-64 (1976).
149. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 137-38.
150. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). The Lord Chief Justice validated exemplary
damages as compensation, punishment, and deterrence.
151. Genay v. Norris, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 6 (1784).
152. Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 77 (1791).
153. Justice Blackmun explained that the Supreme Court had often approved of
the traditional common-law approach to punitive damages, in which the amount of puni-
tive damages is initially decided by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong
and the need to deter others from engaging in similar conduct, and then a review of thejury's award is conducted by the trial and appellate courts for reasonableness. The Court
then cited a 1852 opinion by Justice Grier:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of tres-
pass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view
the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned
by some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are
to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the question will not
admit of argument. By the common as well as by statute law, men are often
punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action,
and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party
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Justice Scalia's concurring opinion was an even stronger endorse-
ment of punitive damages, arguing that historical acceptance of pu-
nitive damages made those damages permissible regardless of a
court's inquiry into "fairness" or "reasonableness." 1"4 In the lone
dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor contended that although puni-
tive damage awards were legitimate, common law procedures for
awarding punitive damages were indiscriminate and posed a devas-
tating potential for harm.'55 In summary, then, although a minority
of the Justices disagreed on the Court's specific review process in
Pacific Mutual Life insurance Co. v. Haslip, all of the United States
Supreme Court Justices affirmed the appropriateness and the long
history of punitive damages in the United States.'56
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue
of punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention, but the current
split in the lower federal courts indicates that the Court may be
forced to resolve this conflict soon. In previous interpretations of the
Warsaw Convention, the Court has stressed the importance of main-
taining the stated purpose and goals of the Warsaw Convention. The
United States Supreme Court has demonstrated its methodology in
determining the meaning of any disputed terms, as well as the im-
portance of complying with the framers' intent.
By applying the United States Supreme Court's own methodology
injured .... This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the
degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circum-
stances of each case.
111 S. Ct at 1042 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)).
154. Justice Scalia objected to Justice Blackmun's case-by-case due process
analysis:
We have expended much ink upon the due-process implications of punitive
damages, and the fact-specific nature of the Court's opinion guarantees that we
and other courts will expend much more in the years to come. Since jury-as-
sessed punitive damages are a part of our living tradition that dates back prior
to 1868, I would end the suspense and categorically affirm their validity.
Id. at 1054.
155. Justice O'Connor's main concern focused on the uncertainty of jury instruc-
tions on punitive damages, which
are so fraught with uncertainty that they defy rational implementation. In-
stead, they encourage inconsistent and unpredictable results .... While I do
not question the general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a strong need to
provide juries with standards to constrain their discretion .... The Constitu-
tion requires as much.
Id. at 1056.
156. Id. at 1032.
and rules of construction, it is apparent that punitive damages are
not prohibited under the Warsaw Convention. The Convention draft-
ers were certainly aware of the potential of punitive damages in
cases of wilful misconduct, yet they did not expressly prohibit puni-
tive damages from being awarded. By allowing plaintiffs to recover
punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court will still abide
by the intent of the Convention's drafters while more effectively de-
terring air carriers from wilful misconduct.
THOMAS P. O'BRIEN
